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abstract
Keywords:

The construction of timelines of computer activity is a part of many digital investigations.

Timeline inconsistency

These timelines of events are composed of traces of historical activity drawn from system

Event correlation

logs and potentially from evidence of events found in the computer file system. A potential

Precondition event

problem with the use of such information is that some of it may be inconsistent and

Happened-before

contradictory thus compromising its value. This work introduces a software tool (CAT

CAT detect

Detect) for the detection of inconsistency within timelines of computer activity. We
examine the impact of deliberate tampering through experiments conducted with our
prototype software tool. Based on the results of these experiments, we discuss techniques
which can be employed to deal with such temporal inconsistencies.
ª 2011 Marrington, Baggili, Mohay & Clark. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1.

Introduction

In this paper, we consider the issue of temporal inconsistencies in digital evidence, and their impact on digital investigations. By temporal inconsistency, we mean an incongruity
in the digital evidence pertaining to the sequence of events in
the history of the computer system, which could lead to the
history being inaccurately reconstructed. Temporal inconsistencies can impede digital investigations in which timelines of
computer activity are an important part of the digital evidence
under consideration. This includes any sort of investigation in
which determining an accurate sequence of events is crucial
to understanding the crime and building a case.
The most common inconsistency in digital evidence is
naturally occurring, that is to say, inconsistency which is not
the result of deliberate tampering. This includes data pertaining to an event or file which simply is not recorded, or may
have been over-written during the normal operation of the
computer system. It also includes “naturally” erroneous or

inaccurate data, perhaps due to a hardware characteristic,
software misconfiguration or bug. Such natural inconsistencies pose difficulties for investigators, even if they are not
the result of deliberate action taken by a suspect.
Timestamps generated by computer clocks are an example
of data of such unreliable accuracy. Where multiple clocks
pertaining to a case generate timestamps, the normal
behaviour of computer hardware clocks (that is to say clock
skew and drift) will cause inconsistency between the different
time sources. Schatz et al. discuss an approach for dealing
with such inconsistencies. Their approach baselines the
behaviour of inconsistent computer clocks via correlation
with records from devices with more authoritative timestamps (Schatz et al., 2006). In single-computer investigations,
clock drift and skew can still lead to inconsistent timestamps
in the evidence. Despite the fact that there is only one clock
providing the timestamps in a single-computer system
investigation, severe cases of clock drift and skew can cause
the timelines that are constructed to be misleading. In
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extreme cases e if there is a clock reset at reboot or some other
mishap and time “goes backwards” e then events may appear
out of the sequence in which they actually occurred.
The deliberate modification of computer records to obscure
records of suspicious activity creates another, and generally
more concerning, sort of inconsistency in digital evidence. For
example, a user who downloads illegal material may attempt
to obscure that fact by deleting web browser history and
caches, event log records showing their login, opening the
browser application, and logging off. If, in a subsequent
forensic investigation, the illegal material is discovered, but
the user was successful in his/her destruction of log data, then
the illegal material will appear to have been downloaded
outside of a user session.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
introduces related work which informed our research.
Section 3 examines approaches for the detection of inconsistency in timelines, dealing both with inconsistencies in event
timestamps and events omitted from the system’s record.
Section 4 describes our experiments with our tool for testing
the approaches discussed in Section 3. Section 5 describes the
results of those experiments and evaluates the detection
techniques. In Section 6 we list the limitations of the CAT
Detect tool at the time of writing this paper, as well as limitations of the research described in this paper. Section 7 is
a discussion of future work in the area of detecting inconsistency in computer activity timelines, and Section 8 is our
conclusion.

2.

Related work

This work employs some of the concepts from the computer
profiling model described by Marrington et al. (2010). This
model of a computer system consists of objects representing
the various entities which form part of the computer system’s
operation. These entities include users, data files, system
software, hardware devices, and applications. The objects
discovered on the computer system under examination
(together comprising the set O) are classified according to their
type. In Marrington et al’s model, there are four broad types of
objects (Application, Principal, Content and System) with
increasingly specific subtypes. We represent each of these
categories as sets. The set of Application objects, A, consists of
all the application software on the computer system. The set
of Principal objects, P, consists of all the computer system’s
users and groups, and all of the people and organisations
otherwise discovered in the examination of the computer
system. Of these objects, some Principal objects are described
as canonical if they represent definite entities on the
computer system which are actors in their own right, such as
users and groups. Principal objects may be described as noncanonical if they represent people or groups of people who
may not be actors on the system, but may be for instance
people mentioned in documents. The set of Content objects, C,
consists of all the documents, images and other data files on
the computer system. The set of System objects, S, consists of
all the configuration information, system software and hardware devices on the computer system. A, S, C, and P are all
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subsets of O. The model also describes relationships between
these objects, but these are unrelated to this work.
The model also includes the set of all times in the history of
the computer system, T, and the set of all events, Evt, which
have taken place in the history of the computer system. Let t
be a time in T, x be the object which instigated the event, y be
the object which was the target of the event, 3 describes the
action of the event, and a describe the result of the event
(either successful, unsuccessful, or unknown). An event evt in
the set Evt consists of the quintuple:
evt ¼ ðt; x˛O; y˛O; 3; aÞ:
In the model, the finite set Evt consists of two enumerable
subsets, and one subset which cannot be enumerated. The
first subset consists of events which are recorded in the
computer system’s logs. The second consists of events which
are not recorded in logs, but which can be inferred on the basis
of other digital evidence on the system (such as relationships
between different objects). These are the recorded events1
(EvtR) and the inferred events (EvtI ) respectively. These two
sets do not exhaustively describe the complete history of the
computer system. There may be other events which took
place which were unrecorded and left no artefact from which
they could be inferred. These events are obviously unknown,
and comprise the final subset of Evt.
The set EvtI is particularly vulnerable to inconsistency or
incompleteness in the data obtained from the target
computer’s file system. Contradictory, inaccurate or missing
information can lead to an incomplete timeline of a user’s
activity. EvtR is a direct representation of the contents of the
computer system’s logs, and consequently, will incorporate
any inaccurate event records in the system logs. Further, if an
event is not logged, and cannot be inferred, it will not be an
element of either EvtR or EvtI. Such an event will therefore be
an unknown event, and the more unknown events in the
history of the computer system, the less complete the timeline of the target computer’s activity will be. This paper
provides a means for the automated detection of inaccuracy
or incompleteness leading to chronological inconsistency in
timelines of computer activity.
In another work, Marrington et al. (2007) discussed a timestamp-based technique for building a timeline about a given
object in the profile of the computer system. A timeline is
a sequence over the set Evt ordered by the timestamp t of each
event where the subject or target of the event was the object
being time-lined o. Such a timeline is constructed by querying
a database of all the recorded events and all the inferred events
in the computer system’s history with the object being timelined as either the subject or target of the event, and then
ordering the results by the event timestamp. This approach is
not resilient to inaccuracies in timestamps, which may cause
events to appear out of sequence. Missing events, whether
removed manually or simply never recorded, lead to timelines
which may present events out of the context in which they
actually occurred. Consequently, this approach to constructing
timelines of computer activity must be supplemented with
1
Marrington et al. (2007) used the term “discovered events”
instead of “recorded events”. We prefer the latter term as it more
accurately describes the nature of such events.
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techniques to detect and deal with inconsistency and incompleteness. We note that as a general principle, the failure to
detect an inconsistency in a timeline is a greater problem for
the purposes of computer activity time-lining than falsely
identifying an event as inconsistent. This is simply because
false positives can be manually investigated and dismissed,
whereas false negatives will never receive further attention.
Nevertheless, it is obviously desirable to minimise the rate of
false positives in all detection techniques.
An obvious limitation of any time-lining activity based on
timestamps provided by a computer’s system clock is the
inaccuracy inherent in such clocks. This inaccuracy in
computer-generated timestamps is “natural”, that is to say, it
is the result of the normal operation of the computer system.
The solution for addressing this issue suggested most
frequently in the literature is to note the system clock time of
a computer under investigation at the time of its examination and to determine the discrepancy between that time and
the time of a reference clock (Boyd and Forster, 2004; Nolan
et al., 2005). However, this solution does not address the
issue of clock skew varying over time prior to the examination of the computer system, and it is this variance which
may lead to inaccuracies in timelines. Studies of large
numbers of hosts on the Internet suggest that many
computer clocks are significantly inaccurate (by a margin of
more than 10s) and that the clocks of many hosts do not
conform to the existing models of clock behaviour (Buchholz
and Tjaden, 2007). Willassen (2008a,b, 2009) proposes an
algebra for the formal expression of falsifiable hypotheses
about the discrepancy between a computer’s clock and
physical time. The term proposed for such a hypothesis is
a clock hypothesis. In practice, it would be necessary to form
a clock hypothesis for every moment in time throughout the
history of the computer system. Our tool is intended to detect
internal inconsistency in timelines. An investigator could
potentially be assisted in the formation of clock hypotheses
using the output of our tool.

3.

Detecting inconsistency in timelines

This section describes the approaches our tool employs to
detect inconsistency in timelines. Inconsistency in computer
activity timelines can arise because events in the timeline are
out of sequence, or because events which should be in the
timeline are missing. The approaches we describe in this
section address both of these scenarios.
Before testing for inconsistency employing the approaches
described in this section, our tool has to perform several tasks.
First, it parses the Windows Event Logs (our tool is intended
for the examination of Windows computers, although the
approach could easily be adapted to other operating systems).
Each event in each of the three logs is normalised and stored
in a database table of recorded events. Each event is stored as
a database row including an ID, a timestamp, the user/application which instigated the event, the object of the event, the
action of the event, and the result of the event. Second, our
tool walks the computer’s hard drive and extracts MAC
(modified-accessed-created) times and file metadata containing timestamps. Third, our tool creates a table of inferred

events in the database for each of the timestamps found in the
walk of the file system. These events are normalised according to the same pattern as recorded events extracted from
logs. The tool then has enough data to both construct
a computer activity timeline and to test it for internal
inconsistency.

3.1.

Detecting out-of-sequence events

It is self-evident that there are some events which can only
take place after some other another event. This sort of relation
is described by Lamport (1978) as the happened-before relation.
Gladyshev and Patel (2005) discuss the application of the
happened-before relation to a forensic context. An example of
such a relation (represented by /) between two events would
be that a user x must log into the computer system before the
user x can execute the application y. Applied to computer
activity time-lining, the real time, if not the timestamp, of the
execution event must be after the real time of the login event.
Let x˛P, y˛A, tn ˛T and tm ˛T:
ðtn ; x; system; login; successÞ/ðtm ; x; y; execute; successÞ
0tm > tn :
After the construction of a timeline (which is a sequence over
the set Evt) in the tool’s execution process, an evaluation can
be applied to all events ordered by their timestamp. If an event
evtA has a happened-before relation to evtB, but the timestamp
(tB) of evtB suggests that evtB occurred before evtA then we can
say that tA and tB are inconsistent. In order to detect this
inconsistency, a rules base must be created which describes
the happened-before relations for the various types of events.
When the timeline is evaluated against the rules base, the
inconsistent events can be identified and assertions about
their timestamps can be made. Consider two rules:
evtA /evtB
evtB /evtC
Where x is a User object, a is an Application object, and system
is a System object representing the target computer system
itself, and:
evtA ¼ ðtA ˛T; x; system; login; successÞ
evtB ¼ ðtB ˛T; x; a; execute; a˛fsuccess; fail; unknowngÞ
evtC ¼ ðtC ˛T; x; system; logout; successÞ:
Note that the happened-before relation is transitive (Lamport,
1978; Gladyshev and Patel, 2005):
ðevtA /evtB Þ^ðevtB /evtC Þ0evtA /evtC :
For the purposes of this example, let the time-lining function
H(x) produce a timeline corresponding to a single user session
of the user x. The first rule states that a user x must be logged
in before executing any application. The second, that user x
cannot have logged out before performing that execution. If
the execution event evtB occurs, the login event evtA must
happen-before it, and evtB must happen-before the logout event
evtC. Therefore the physical time tC at which the event evtC
must have occurred must be after the physical time tB at
which the event evtB must have occurred, which must in turn
be after the physical time tA at which the event evtA must have
occurred. This is stated:
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HðxÞJfevtA ; evtB ; evtC g0ðtC > tB > tA Þ:
If, given the two rules evtA / evtB and evtB / evtC, it is not the
case that tC > tB > tA, then the timestamps tA, tB, and tC do not
reflect the physical times at which the events must have
occurred. The timestamps are therefore inaccurate, as they
suggest an internally inconsistent chronology. From this
example, the utility of the happened-before relation as a basis
for proposing rules for the detection of inconsistent events is
apparent. A hypothesised chronology of a computer system
can be evaluated for internal inconsistencies by testing the
hypothesised sequence of events against a set of happenedbefore rules.

3.2.

Detecting missing events

There are some happened-before relations where the first event
is a precondition for the second. In such relations, the presence of the second event necessarily implies the presence of
the first. In the example in Section 3.1, the login event evtA
must occur before the application execution event evtB, such
that if evtB occurred, then evtA should also have occurred. This
does not hold true for all happened-before relations, however.
This can be seen in the same example, where although the
execution event evtB must happen-before the logout event evtC
in order for evtB to happen at all, the occurrence of the logout
event evtC does not imply that evtB also happened. This is
because evtB is not a precondition for evtC. Where such
a precondition does exist, it is expressed with the predicate
“precondition”, as shown below. A second predicate,
“happened”, is employed to assert that some event occurred.
ðevtA /evtB Þ^ðhappenedðevtB Þ0happenedðevtA ÞÞ
rpreconditionðevtA ; evtB Þ:
Willassen (2008a,b) extends the use of the happened-before
relation of Lamport (1978), Fidge (1991) and Gladyshev and
Patel (2005) to imply causality. Willassen’s version of the
happened-before relation is therefore equivalent to the
“precondition” predicate. For the purposes of the tool we
developed, it is preferable to maintain the happened-before
relation as described by Lamport (1978), Fidge (1991) and
Gladyshev and Patel (2005), and to employ the “precondition”
predicate to imply a causal relationship. The happened-before
relation allows for the detection of events which are listed in
the timeline out of the sequence in which they must have
occurred, whereas the “precondition” predicate allows for the
detection of missing events.
If the event evtA which “happened” does not exist in either
the set of recorded events EvtR or the existing set of inferred
events EvtI, then it is a missing event. It is a missing event
because it was removed from or never recorded in the
computer system’s logs, and it was not previously inferred on
the basis of relationships and object fields. These events could
also be called inferred events, but it is convenient to preserve
a distinction between events detected using this approach and
other inferred events.
The rules base in the example in Section 3.1 can be
expanded to include all pairs of events for which the “precondition” predicate is true. If an event evtx has a precondition
event specified by a rule, then the presence of the precondition
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event can be inferred, even if it is absent from EvtR and EvtI.
Precondition events which are absent from EvtR and EvtI can be
added to the set of missing events, which we call EvtM.
The new rules base, expanded from that in Section 3.1, is:
evtA /evtB
evtB /evtC
preconditionðevtA ; evtB Þ
The login event evtA, the application execution event evtB, and
the logout event evtC have the same definitions as in the
previous example. The new rule states that if the event evtB
occurred in the timeline of the User object x, then the event
evtA must also have occurred. This is expressed:
ðevtB ˛HðxÞÞ0happenedðevtA Þ
revtA ˛EVT
rðevtA ;ðEVTRWEVTIÞÞ0evtA ˛EVTM:
Detecting missing events is important, as such an event may
have been deliberately deleted from system logs, which may
in itself be suspicious. Detecting that an event is missing
allows for the construction of a more complete timeline,
helping the investigator gain a more complete understanding
of the computer system. By automatically indicating that
a particular point in the timeline an event was either not
recorded or its record was deleted, such software could
provide a lead for subsequent manual investigation, which
may determine why the record is missing. If the event record
was deliberately deleted, this may indicate that the user was
attempting to conceal suspicious activity.
There are, of course, many instances where an event may
be missing as a result of non-suspicious computer activity.
Our tool infers events to describe an action by or on an object
with associated temporal data. These inferred events are
combined with events recorded in system logs in order to
provide as complete a timeline as possible. In our experiments on computers running Microsoft Windows, our tool
inferred many events which occurred prior to the enabling of
many logging options in the Windows event logs. There were
therefore very few recorded events from that early time
period in the computer’s history, and thus these inferred
events were out-of-context. Such inferred events may appear
to have occurred outside of user sessions, or in an otherwise
inconsistent fashion, however, the absence of complete
information must obviously be considered in the investigator’s assessment as to whether or not the event is suspicious.
This scenario is an example of how the normal configuration of the computer system may make an event seem
inconsistent.

4.

Detection experiments

This section describes experiments in which the approach to
detecting temporal inconsistency in user sessions described
in Section 3 was tested. We examine timelines as developed
by our prototype software in the following experiments:
 The unmodified timeline of a user session during which the
user creates a document, and does not attempt to obscure
his/her actions.
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Fig. 1 e CAT Detect prototype for inconsistency checking.

 The unmodified timeline of a user session during which the
user creates a document with deliberately misleading
authorship information.
 Modified timelines of the above two user sessions where the
system logs have been tampered with.

4.1.

Prototype software

As mentioned in previous sections, we developed CAT Detect
in order to detect inconsistency in computer activity timelines. The prototype software examines the target computer
system’s file system (which is mounted read-only) and
enumerates the applications, files, and users of the target
computer system. The Windows Event Logs are parsed, and
the events described in those logs are stored as the set of
recorded events (EvtR) in the database table Recorded Events.
Finally, a set of events are inferred from the temporal data
associated with each file. These events are the inferred events
(EvtI ), and are saved in a separate table in the database called
Inferred Events. After conducting this automated process, the
software prototype provides a basic interface for the purpose
of detecting temporal inconsistency in a given timeline,
shown in Fig 1.
The detection techniques described in Section 3 match the
events in a timeline against the events in each rule being
tested (as listed in Section 4.2). Programmatically, every rule is

implemented by a Java object2, and every event is implemented by a Java object. Rule objects have two event objects
as fields, one called evtA and another called evtB. The objects
evtA and evtB are archetype events, against which real events
are compared. A real event is compared against the archetypes on the basis of the fields of each. The fields of the
archetype events can have a specific value, or be null. If the
archetype has a specific value for a particular field, then any
real event which matches the archetype must have the same
value. If the archetype has a null value for a particular field, it
can match any value for the real event’s corresponding field.
The rule object can also be set to match subject and target
fields, that is to say, to require that both matching events have
the same subject or target field. The rule can also specify that
that the subject field of one event is the target of the other
event, or vice versa. This allows for the definition of generic
rules. Consider the following example rule, which expresses
the concept that a user object (u˛PIU) must log into the
computer system (s˛S) before modifying any file:


ðti ˛T; u; s; logon; successÞ;
:
precondition
ðtk ˛T; u; c˛C; modified; successÞ
2

We anticipate that in future versions, rules will be userspecifiable either through a graphical interface or XML configuration file. In the version used for the experiments described here,
rules were hard-coded.
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In the object which represented this rule, evtA would represent
the “logon” event, and evtB would represent the “modified”
event. A Boolean field of the rule object would be set to true to
indicate that the subject of each event had to be the same
object, u. Given this, the values of the fields of the objects evtA
and evtB would be as follows:
evtA ¼ ðnull; null; s; logon; successÞ
evtB ¼ ðnull; null; null; modified; successÞ:
The prototype CAT Detect software does not yet implement
the concept of a user session. A logon or logoff event is treated
the same as any other event. This means that the user needs
to specify which events are to be treated as the beginning and
end of the user session timeline. In order to check timelines of
a computer system’s complete history, the prototype software
would need to have a concept of user session built into it. This
is an item of future work (Fig. 2).

4.2.

Rules base for experiments

The software prototype incorporates a small set of rules to
check for temporal inconsistency. It provides an interface
which allows the user to specify a timeline to be checked for
inconsistency. It then checks that timeline against the rules
base. The rules built into the prototype software for the
purposes of these experiments are as follows:
preconditionðuserlogin; userlogoutÞ
preconditionðuserlogin; filecreatedÞ
preconditionðuserlogin; filemodifiedÞ
preconditionðuserlogin; filemodifiedÞ
filecreated/userlogout
filemodified/userlogout
fileaccessed/userlogout
Where x is a Principal object representing the user, y is
a Content object representing a file, system is the System
object which represents the computer system, tA through tE
are times in the history of the computer, and:
userlogin ¼ ðtA ; x; system; logon; successÞ
userlogout ¼ ðtB ; x; system; logoff; successÞ
filecreated ¼ ðtC ; x; y; created; successÞ
filemodified ¼ ðtD ; x; y; modified; successÞ
fileaccessed ¼ ðtE ; x; y; opened; successÞ:
The data structures in our implementation which represented each of the archetype events in the rules base had null
evtA = (null, null, s, “logon”, “success”)
evtB = (null, null, null, “modified”, “success”)
rule = evtA happened-before evtB
where field 2 of evtA == x
and where field 2 of evtB == x
for each evt in H(x)
if evt = ( *, x, s, “logon”, “success” )
a = index of evt
if evt = ( *, x, *, “modified”, “success” )
b = index of evt
next evt
if a > b then
rule has been broken

Fig. 2 e Example inconsistency detection.
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values in place of the fields x, y and tA through tE. As discussed in Section 4.1, null values are wild card values in our
prototype software. Each rule had a Boolean field set to true,
which specified that the subject of every event, x, had to be
the same.

4.3.

Data

In order to obtain data for these experiments, we employed
a suspect test computer running Windows XP. All system
logging options were turned on in order to give us as complete
a set of Windows Event Logs as possible. We logged onto the
computer twice for the purpose of generating two different
user sessions: the first, an “innocent” user session, and the
second, a user session in which a document was created with
misleading authorship information. The details of these two
sessions are described below.
We also wanted to explore the detection of meddling with
Windows Event Logs. For this purpose, we copied the case file
and database about the test computer system generated by
our tool, and then manually modified the database table
containing the discovered events. As these discovered events
are derived from the Windows Event Logs, the removal or
modification of recorded events in the set EvtR effectively
simulates the removal or modification of event records in the
Windows Event Logs. We removed the log-on/log-off events
from the first user session, and modified the timestamps of
these events on the second user session so that they would be
presented out of their real sequence if ordered by timestamp.
The modified timelines are described below.

5.

Evaluation of detection technique

This section describes each of the timelines examined in these
experiments, and presents the results of the prototype software’s analysis of inconsistency. There are four timelines (two
unmodified, and two modified) which correspond directly to
user sessions. Each of the timelines is a combination of the
inferred events and the recorded events in the history of the
computer system between two boundary events, ordered by
timestamp. In regards to the inferred events, it should be
noted that the software assumes that people can be assumed
to be unique by their name. This means that when the tool
extracted the author name “baddie” from some Microsoft
Word documents on the target computer, the tool assumed
that this person was the same as the user “baddie”.

5.1.

Timeline A: normal user session

Timeline A was a normal user session during which a Microsoft Word document was created. The user “baddie” logged
into the computer system at 6:47pm on 9 October 2008, and
created the file “invoice.doc” at 6:51pm. The user then
browsed the Internet for a few minutes and logged off at
6:59pm. Nothing suspicious happened in the user session. The
timeline consisted of all of the events which took place during
the user session, both recorded and inferred. Our software
inserted these events into its event database during its automated examination of the target system.
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Table 1 e The inconsistent events detected in timeline B and the rules they violated.
Time

Subject

Target

Action

9/10/08 20:13:00

USER baddie27660658

CREATED

precondition(userlogin, filecreated)

9/10/08 20:13:00
9/10/08 20:15:21

USER baddie27660658
USER baddie27660658

CREATED
MODIFIED

precondition(userlogin,filecreated)
precondition(userlogin, filemodified)

9/10/08 20:15:21

USER baddie27660658

OPENED

precondition(userlogin, fileaccessed)

9/10/08 20:15:23

USER baddie27660658

CREATED

precondition(userlogin, filecreated)

9/10/08 20:15:23
9/10/08 20:15:23
9/10/08 20:15:23

USER baddie27660658
USER baddie27660658
USER baddie27660658

WORDDOC letter from baddie to
nefarious.doc14850080
WORDDOC Normal.dot20348456
WORDDOC letter from baddie
to nefarious.doc14850080
WORDDOC letter from baddie
to nefarious.doc14850080
WORDDOC letter from baddie
to nefarious.doc14850080
WORDDOC Normal.dot20348456
WORDDOC Normal.dot20348456
WORDDOC Normal.dot20348456

CREATED
MODIFIED
OPENED

precondition(userlogin, filecreated)
precondition(userlogin, filemodified)
precondition(userlogin, fileaccessed)

Most events in timeline A were discovered events (i.e.
discovered in the Windows Event Logs), however, the events
with “CREATED”, “MODIFIED” or “OPENED” as their actions
were inferred events (i.e. inferred on the basis of an object, its
relationships, or other information about the object).
An inconsistency check of timeline A against the rules
provided in Section 4.2 demonstrated no inconsistencies. The
results of the analysis of timeline A were as expected.

5.2.

Timeline B: deliberate misattribution of authorship

Timeline B was a user session during which the user created
a Microsoft Word document with misleading authorship
information, in an effort to shift responsibility for that document to an innocent third party. The user “crook” logged into
the computer system at 7:04pm on 9 October 2008, and at
8:15pm a Word document was created with “baddie” as the
listed author. The user “crook” then logged off.
Timeline B was analysed for inconsistency with our prototype software. Table 1 shows the inconsistent events detected
in this timeline along with the rule from our rules base which
were broken by each event. These events all related to the
authorship of the Word document “WORDDOC letter from
baddie to nefarious.doc14850080”. The “baddie” user was not
logged in at the time the Word document was created, and yet
the author field listed “baddie” as the document’s author.
Therefore, “baddie” could not have been the author of
“WORDDOC letter from baddie to nefarious.doc14850080”.
It can be seen in Table 1 that there are two sets of
“CREATED” events for both the suspect Word document and
its template. This is because there are two sources of information which lead the prototype software to inferring such
an event. The earlier timestamp is obtained from the Word

Rule

document’s metadata, and is the time at which the document was first created in Microsoft Word. The later timestamp is obtained from the target computer’s file system, and
is the time at which the document was first saved as a file on
the disk. Both sets of “CREATED” events derive their subject
field from the same source, the Word document’s author
field.

5.3.
Timeline C: user session with logon/logoff events
deleted
Timeline C was derived from timeline A. The recorded and
inferred events table in the prototype software’s events database were copied and manually modified. The resulting timeline, timeline C, was identical to timeline A without the logon/
logoff events. The removal of these two discovered events left
user activity outside of a logon/logoff-bound user session.
The prototype software’s temporal inconsistency check
listed all of the inferred events with “USER baddie27660658” as
the subject as inconsistent. These events were all listed as
inconsistent on the basis of violating precondition rules with
a user login event as the precondition. The inconsistent
events from timeline C are listed in Table 2. These results were
as expected. This demonstrates that removing user session
information from the Windows Event Log will draw attention
to the inferred events which took place during the session.

5.4.

Timeline D: user session with modified timestamps

Timeline D was derived from timeline A, with the timestamp
of the user’s logoff event deliberately modified so as to appear
to have taken place prior to the creation of the “WORDDOC
invoice.doc19509473” document. The timestamp of “USER

Table 2 e Inconsistent events detected in timeline C, as a result of the login precondition not being met.
Time
9/10/2008 18:50:46
9/10/2008 18:50:46
9/10/2008 18:51:49
9/10/2008 18:51:49
9/10/2008 18:51:49
9/10/2008 18:51:49

Subject
USER
USER
USER
USER
USER
USER

baddie27660658
baddie27660658
baddie27660658
baddie27660658
baddie27660658
baddie27660658

Target
WORDDOC
WORDDOC
WORDDOC
WORDDOC
WORDDOC
WORDDOC

invoice.doc19509473
invoice.doc19509473
Normal.dot3981922
Normal.dot3981922
Normal.dot3981922
invoice.doc19509473

Action
MODIFIED
OPENED
CREATED
MODIFIED
OPENED
CREATED

Rule
precondition(userlogin,
precondition(userlogin,
precondition(userlogin,
precondition(userlogin,
precondition(userlogin,
precondition(userlogin,

filemodified)
fileaccessed)
filecreated)
filemodified)
fileaccessed)
filecreated)
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baddie27660658”’s logoff was changed from 18:59:37pm to
18:51:23pm.
The prototype software’s inconsistency check of timeline D
listed “USER baddie27660658”’s logoff event as inconsistent, as
shown in Table 3. The event was listed as breaking three rules,
all of which ultimately assert that if a file is modified, accessed
or created, it must be modified, accessed or created prior to
the user logging out of the computer system.
The results of the analysis of timeline D were just as expected. The detection of this event demonstrates the suitability of this approach to detecting events whose timestamps
are modified.

5.5.

Discussion of results

The results of the experiments demonstrate that automatically detecting temporal inconsistency in computer activity
timelines constructed from realistic data is possible using our
tool. These experiments applied a simple rules set to
a computer system’s activity timeline, and the results
demonstrate that inconsistency can be detected in several
basic scenarios. The happened-before relation and the precondition predicate can be used together to construct effective
rules to draw an investigator’s attention to suspicious events.
Timeline B demonstrated that such rules can be applied to
detect an event (in this case, the creation of a document)
initiated by a different user than first suggested by the file
system. Timeline C showed that the deletion of system log
entries pertaining to important events can be detected. If the
deleted events are preconditions for other events, which are
recorded or inferred, then they can be detected. Timeline D
demonstrated that, by applying a rational set of rules in an
automated analysis of a timeline, events can be detected
which should have occurred in another sequence than their
timestamps suggest.
The experiment’s use of data from a computer system
demonstrated that this approach to detecting temporal
inconsistency is robust enough to be tested in real cases. The
logical next step will be to perform experiments with CAT
Detect using real case data, which will test the robustness and
suitability of the approach with regards to real digital investigations. The noise in real event data is a lesser problem to
a software tool than it is to a human investigator. By distilling
event records down to the most important fields which are
common to most events, our approach reduces the
complexity and heterogeneity of the various types of events.
This makes the testing of a set of simple logical predicates
(such as the rules base employed in the experiments,
described in Section 4.2) against a timeline of recorded and
inferred events relatively straightforward. The results of these

experiments demonstrate that this method of testing for
inconsistency in timelines is effective in practical computer
systems. Further experimentation, as noted in the future work
section below, will be necessary to determine whether this
effectiveness extends to real investigations.

6.

Time

Subject

Action

Rules

9/10/2008
18:51:23

USER
baddie
27660658

LOGOFF

filecreated / userlogout,
filemodified / userlogout,
fileaccessed / userlogout

Limitations

As acknowledged at several points throughout this paper, the
CAT Detect software has several limitations. We hope that
these limitations will be addressed in future versions of the
CAT Detect software.
The most serious of these limitations is the CAT Detect
prototype software’s inability to automatically detect user
sessions. This requires the user to provide the boundaries (i.e.
first and last event) of the computer activity timeline whose
consistency they wish to evaluate. This is a serious limitation
as it requires the investigator to have some knowledge, at
least with respect to the period, of the event under investigation. If this limitation could be overcome and CAT Detect
could identify user sessions itself, then it could be used to
assess entire computer histories for inconsistency with no
prior knowledge.
The experiments described in this paper were limited as
they were not conducted using data from real cases. Instead,
the experiments were conducted using a simplistic test
scenario performed on a test machine as a “case”. Although
CAT Detect performed well in this case, we are not yet able to
validate its robustness or reliability with respect to real cases.
Further, our experiments using the data from the test
machine were limited in their extent only to the operating
system and software installed on that machine (Windows XP,
Microsoft Office 2007, and other common “office computer”
software). Results with newer versions of Windows or nonWindows operating systems may vary. Further testing with
different data sets is required. This further testing will allow
investigators to establish confidence in the CAT Detect tool.
It is hoped that these limitations will be addressed by the
future work described in Section 7 below, and through the
release of the CAT Detect prototype as free and open source
software. We hope that publicly releasing CAT Detect as open
source software will achieve two things. First, we hope that
CAT Detect will attract a community of users who will use it in
a variety of cases and provide feedback. Second, we hope that
CAT Detect will attract contributions from developers and
researchers to address the tool’s shortcomings and improve
upon its functionality.

7.
Table 3 e The inconsistent event in timeline D, which
was detected on the basis of breaking three rules. The
target of the event is the system.
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Future work

CAT Detect is still in the research in progress phase. There are
five main areas in which we hope to improve CAT Detect.
Primarily, we hope to create an interface in which rules for
inconsistency can be created and saved in a configuration file.
These rules can then be shared amongst investigator
communities so they can use them during their investigative
process using the CAT Detect tool.
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Second, we hope to build an automatic Windows Event Log
parser into CAT Detect to speed-up the overall process of
acquiring Event Log data, and improve the quality of this data.
This is primarily a development activity as opposed to
a research one.
Third, we hope to improve CAT Detect so that the software
can automatically detect user sessions. At the moment, the
prototype software requires the user to specify the bounds (i.e.
start and finish) of a user session before it is able to check the
timeline of that session for internal consistency.
Fourth, we hope to extend the CAT Detect process and
software to construct and consistency-check timelines of
computers running non-Windows operating systems. We also
would like to test and refine CAT Detect with data from
Windows Vista and Windows 7 computers, and compare the
results compared to otherwise similar cases where the
computer involved ran Windows XP.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, in order to further
validate and improve CAT Detect, it is important to conduct
experiments on known cases which involve some timeline
inconsistencies. We are particularly interested to test the
robustness of the CAT Detect approach in real cases involving
deliberate tampering. This can help validate our proposed
method with relation to real-life scenarios.

8.

Conclusion

Inconsistencies in a computer activity timeline can compromise the value of the timeline as an investigative tool. If an
investigator accepts the original digital evidence from the
target computer system uncritically, a time-lining tool may
produce a history of the computer system which is unusable
as a result of inaccuracy. Perhaps worse, the investigator may
fall victim to an adversary’s deliberate modification of system
logs and other temporal data, and create a misleading history
of the adversary’s own devising.
We have developed a tool, implementing techniques for
detecting contradictory and missing events in the history of
the computer system. Our experiments with this software
demonstrate that the techniques we have proposed can be
used successfully to detect temporal inconsistencies in
a computer activity timeline. The automatic detection of
inconsistencies which might indicate deliberate tampering
could assist a human investigator in a subsequent manual
examination of the system.
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